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TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1467, JANUARY 13, 6 PM

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AFTER CONVERSATION THIS MORNING (EMBTel 1464) ON MILITARY SUBJECTS, CHANCELLOR SAID HE WANTED TALK BRENTANO, STRAUSS, MYSELF ABOUT POLITICAL MATTERS.

1. HE BELIEVES THREE OCCUPYING POWERS BERLIN MUST USE FORCE IF NECESSARY INCLUDING AGAINST GDR POLICE TO MAINTAIN POSITION BERLIN. IF THIS NOT DONE U.S. WILL HAVE LOST GAME. HIGHLY UNLIKELY SOVIETS WOULD RISK HOT WAR, BUT IF EUROPEAN FAITH IN U.S. PLEDGES AND DETERMINATION WERE SHAKEN IT WOULD BE FATAL BLOW TO EUROPE AND NATO.

2. IN RECENT TALK WITH HALLSTEIN, LATTER INFORMED CHANCELLOR ECONOMIC POTENTIAL SIX NATION COMMUNITY IS AS 17 TO US 20. IF SOVIETS THROUGH COLD WAR ACQUIRE THIS 17 THEY WOULD HAVE VAST SUPERIORITY OVER US AND DISLOCATE US ECONOMY WHICH WOULD RESULT IN POLITICAL CATASTROPHE. IT IS EQUALLY IN EUROPEAN AND US INTEREST TO HAVE FAITH IN US REMAIN INTACT.

3. ABOVE REFLECTIONS PROMPTED BY HIS READING RECENT GREWE-MURPHY AND GREWE-HILLENBRAND EXCHANGES. ASKED BRENTANO AND STRAUSS FOR COMMENTS.


4. BRENTANO EMPHASIZED NECESSITY NOT WEAKENING ON DEC 11 AND DEC 16 PARIS COMMUNIQUE. THINKS RISK OF GENERAL WAR REDUCED BY MAINTAINING FIRM STAND AGREED PARIS.

5. STRAUSS EXPRESSED OPINION SOVIETS WILL NOT START HOT WAR,

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-2-1467, JANUARY 13, 6 PM FROM BONN

BUT WILL ADOPT SERIES SLOW STRANGULATION MEASURES REGARD BERLIN. IF WESTERN POWERS FIRM SOVIETS WILL NOT ALLOW INTERFERENCE ACCESS IMMEDIATELY. ADDRESSING HIMSELF TO ME, HE ASKED I CONVEY HIS REQUEST THAT WHEN MILITARY PLANS RE BERLIN ARE DISCUSSED, FEDREP BE PERMITTED SHARE IN DELIBERATIONS, OR, FAILING THAT, BE INFORMED OF SUBSTANCE ALLIED INTENTIONS.

6. CHANCELLOR RESUMED COMMENTARY. THINKS SOVIET OBJECTIVE NOT TO DESTROY WORLD BUT TO RULE IT. SOVIETS HAVE MISSIONARY FERVOR. US ONLY OBSTACLE TO REALIZATION WORLD DOMINATION. BELIEVES DAMAGE TO US ECONOMY THEIR CHIEF PRESENT TACTIC. HOWEVER, THEIR REPRESENTATIONS CONCERNING THEIR PRODUCTION ACHIEVEMENTS ARE A "SWINDLE".

7. ADENAUER SAID HE HAD NOT INFORMED ME YESTERDAY, SINCE I WAS IN HEIDELBERG, OF HIS ACTION IN SENDING DITTMAN TO WASHINGTON AND LETTER TO SECRETARY TO EXPLAIN MISGIVINGS OVER APPOINTMENT GRANTED MIKOYAN TO SEE PRESIDENT EISENHOWER. WE WOULD BE FOOLISH TO INDULGE IN ANY OPTIMISM OVER MIKOYAN VISIT; AIDE-MEMOIRE ON BERLIN WAS AS ROUGH AND TOUGH AS EVER; AND THE PROPOSED PEACE TREATY DRAFT WAS OUTRAGEOUS. PRESIDENT SHOULD NOT RECEIVE MIKOYAN, WHO WOULD PLAY UP MEETING AT FORTHCOMING PARTY CONGRESS AS HAVING BEEN SUCCESSFUL AND PRELIMINARY TO SUMMIT CONFERENCE.

8. NEXT HE TALKED, RATHER FOOLISHLY I THOUGHT, ABOUT KHRUSHCHEV'S POSITION BEING IMPERILLED BY THE RESTORATION OF MOLOTOV AND BULGANIN TO FAVOR AND LIKELIHOOD KHRUSHCHEV LOSING OFFICE. BRENTANO AND STRAUSS LOOKED BEWILDERED.

9. I TOLD CHANCELLOR I TOTALLY DISBELIEVED THERE HAD BEEN ANY WEAKENING OR WOULD BE OF US DETERMINATION ON BERLIN OR OTHER GERMAN PROBLEMS. I HAD NOT SEEN REPORT OF GREWE-HILLENBRAND

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INTERVIEW, BUT WAS FAMILIAR WITH CONTENT GREWE-MURPHY CONVERSATION. SEEMED TO ME REQUEST BY US FOR FEDREP VIEWS IN CONNECTION POSSIBLE NEGOTIATIONS WITH SOVIETS WAS UTTERLY REASONABLE AND NECESSARY, AND THERE COULD BE NO HARM OR EVIDENCE OF WEAKENING ON BERLIN IF OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS WERE TO DISCUSS IN MUTUAL CONFIDENCE VARIOUS TACTICS AND MATTERS OF SUBSTANCE THAT WERE CERTAIN TO COME UP. I WAS SURE HE WAS ENTIRELY MISTAKEN IN DISPLAYING DOUBTS IN THIS REGARD.

10. ADENAUER REPLIED THAT HE HAD NOT INTENDED TO QUESTION THE PROPRIETY OF THE TALKS BETWEEN HIS AMBASSADOR AND DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS, BUT THAT US MUST NOT SUCCUMB TO SOVIET BLANDISHMENTS. I ASSURED HIM THAT SUCH AN ERROR WAS NOT IN QUESTION.

11. CHANCELLOR LOOKED TIRED. HE HAS HAD SLIGHT BRONCHIAL TROUBLE FOR WEEKS. HE TALKED FURTHER AND AT GREAT LENGTH ABOUT MIKOYAN'S UNRELIABILITY, AND HOW MISTAKEN IT WAS FOR THE AMERICAN PUBLIC TO HAVE RECEIVED HIM SO ENTHUSIASTICALLY, ETC. I TOLD HIM NOT TO WORRY OVER THIS, MIKOYAN WAS A VISITING CURIOSITY.

12. SUGGEST AFTER MEETING WITH MIKOYAN, ADENAUER BE INFORMED SOONEST POSSIBLE WHAT TRANSPIRED.

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